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WHEN BLACK IS WHITE
By J. W. KELLEY, of the Denver Bar
R. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS' dignified lament over the
of the American Constitution provoked by the recent Gold Decision* is only one of a long list of similar
complaints that have resounded through our history. That
decision denied the citizen the right to be paid in gold which
the government would immediately take away from him.
Frequently in years gone by our cherished traditions have
apparently gone to smash and innocent bystanders have concluded the end had come. The constitution had hardly got
in working order when Thomas Jefferson purchased the
Louisiana Territory. It was believed then in high quarters
that the Sage of Monticello had make junk of the solemn
guarantees of 1787. James Madison was charged with having wrecked the constitution when he brought on the war of
1812. Andrew Jackson's favorite doctrine in effect was that
every official should interpret the constitution to suit himself.
Then James K. Polk declared war on the young republic
across the Rio Grande, not taking the entire responsibility
but shifting the blame onto Mexico. If presidents could do
these things, said the descendants of Cassandra, they were
kings and our liberties were gone. Secession by the Southern states put another strain on the constitution. Texas had
seceded from Mexico a few years before and we had welcomed her with open arms, aiding and abetting the secession
and paying a large sum for the privilege. Then we helped
West Virginia secede from Virginia in the midst of a war to
end secession.
About that time Mexico, owing France, Spain and England a hundred million dollars, defaulted on the annual interest and the three creditors came with warships and seized
the custom house at Vera Cruz and put Maximilian in as
receiver. Those who loved the Monroe doctrine were inconsolable. The doctrine that no European power should
extend its possessions on this continent we had firmly im-

Mruin

*Norman v. B. t&0. Ry. Co., 55 S. Ct. 407.

"Loss of reputation for honorable dealing will bring us unending
humiliation; the impending legal and moral chaos is appalling."

-Dissenting opinion.
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bedded in the foundations of our national system; only
occasionally ignoring it, as when we allowed Great Britain to
acquire a slice of our northern territory under the arrangement
known as the northwest boundary treaty.
Among our national crown jewels consistency seems not
to be numbered. Justice McReynold's brave warning, like
a bugle blown in a sleeping encampment, did not arouse us
as it should. We yawned and slept on. It had all happened
before. A generation ago we learned we could not take over
a few islands in the Pacific without being nagged by those
who adored the firm restraints of the constitution. But after
each wreck the constitution seemed even better than before:
the more liberties we lost the more remained. We have come
to believe that Webster's sonorous climax in his reply to
Hayne should have been: "Union and Liberty, one and inseparable, adaptable and elastic!"
"Facit ex albo nigrum ex nigro album" is an old law
maxim assuring us that under certain circumstances black can
legally be white. It was never truer than now.

ANNUAL MEETING OF AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
An old carpenter's mallet, glorified beyond its estate with
bands of gold and silver, will, for the fifty-seventh year, boom
out its command for silence when the American Bar Association members assemble in Los Angeles on July 15 for the
opening day of the annual meeting.
Trimmed by the Colorado Bar Association for the second time in 1926 with bands of virgin silver and gold from
the Pikes Peak Region, the hickory gavel is in reality an old
carpenter's mallet that was purchased for seventeen cents in
1878 when the American Bar Association was founded.
Since that date the mallet has made its appearance at every
meeting.
Nearly five thousand lawyers will hear its command on
July 15 when Scott M. Loftin, president of the association,
raps for order. Advance hotel and special train reservations
indicate that the national gathering will be well attended.

CAN NRA BE MADE CONSTITUTIONAL?
By FRAZER ARNOLD, EsQ., of the Denver Bar.
HE poultry decision handed down recently has caused
much comment. The dispatches from Washington are
now full of conjectures by various persons upon how the
codes and the act can be revamped "to meet the objections of
the Supreme Court" and still survive. In my opinion all such
conjectures are vain and useless. The act and the codes are
impossible. They are incapable of cure. No mere technicalities are available; no devices floating in the air for a "smart"
luminary to discover, in order to "satisfy" a court. Whatever
the fond hopes or noble motives may have been that inspired
the act and codes, they were a lethal rapier-thrust at the heart
of our constitutional liberty and government. All that a
despotism or a dictatorship is, is a form of government where
the three elements are so fused, or confused, in one person
or department that the executive is also in effect the legislature.
with a judiciary that does not function as a check upon the
despot's actions. Where that condition develops, there is
regardless of names, an end of liberty both in business and personal affairs, an end of constitutional government, with its
indispensable checks and balances.
The doom of the codes was in reality spelled by the
Supreme Court, not in the poultry case, but in the oil decision
of last January. It was not necessary to wait for the Belcher
lumber code case from Alabama, or for this poultry case from
Brooklyn which the government imagined was "stronger," in
order to foresee the fate of the entire NRA plan. In the oil
case, Congress undertook (by Section 9-c) to leave it to the
President to say whether it should be legal or illegal for
private interests to transport oil in interstate commerce above
certain quotas, that is, undertook to delegate to the executive
the right to legislate on that subject. And the Supreme Court
knocked that out, as an illegal abrogation by Congress of
its function and duty. Applying this principle to the codes,
what did one find? No code was ever enacted by Congress.
Each code was framed by volunteers in the particular trade or
industry who had formed a "group," and was then submitted
by this group, not to Congress, but to the executive. The
executive then decided whether or not he would approve, i. e.,
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enact it. If he approved it, then the bill had passed the President, and was supposed to have all the effect of a federal
statute that had successfully run the gamut first of approval
by a committee of Congress and then of adoption on the floor
by both houses of that legislative body. Under the act, the
President also was supposed to have power to adopt codes sua
sponte if he thought particular industries needed them. All
this was executive legislation with a vengeance: whole industries and lines of business put under the most minute and rigid
hamstringing and regulation, in an infinite variety of details,
by presidential ukase. The codes were simply statutes, prescribing a multitude of rules, large and small; and they were
enacted by the President. Congress had nothing to do with
them, except to say to the President that he might proceed and
pass those statutes himself, or not, as he saw fit.
Having decided the oil case as it had, what possible
chance was there for the Supreme Court to uphold the codes?
Obviously none. The codes were the reductio ad absurdum
of the whole vogue and practice of allowing executive officials
to legislate under some general grant of power. That the
codes presented a more obvious case than the oil statute is
shown by the fact that one justice dissented in the oil case, but
even he turned thumbs down against the codes. No court
decision was really necessary. The codes and the act clearly
flouted the very first section of the first article of our written
constitution. Time has been wasted in many courts over the
question whether a given activity was interstate or intrastate or whether it affected interstate commerce, upon the tacit
though erroneous assumption that Congress can play as it
likes with the rights and interests of any business embarked in
interstate activity-whereas the basic question was whether
there existed the ineradicable vice of a delegation of legislative
authority. If so, it was immaterial whether the commerce was
interstate, as in the oil case, or intrastate as in the poultry
decision.
Now, the essence of the entire NRA conception is this
illegal delegation of power. An NRA without it would be
emptier than Hamlet with the-Immortal Dane left out. Assuming that the particulars of a code would be valid as legislation, it could only be adopted by Congress itself, and Con-
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gress could labor from now until doomsday without agreeing upon a small traction of the 600 codes that were adopted
under the late scheme. Congress will never attempt it, and
if it did, its committee hearings alone would be endless.
But this, in my opinion, is the smallest part of the objection to any more or further codes.
No doubt one may eliminate from a legal discussion any
proposed system of "voluntary codes." In a country like ours,
on the grand scale, they would never work, and would perhaps make endless difficulties in the way of monopoly. There
remains only the suggestion that codes affecting interstate
commerce, duly enacted by Congress itself, not by the President, and limited to a few large industries, would be valid and
practicable. The answer to that suggestion is that the staple
ingredient of the late codes has been a mass of regulation, e. g.,
of wages, hours, trade practices, policies and details, with
which Congress has no more right to meddle, under the guise
or pretended authority of the commerce clause, than a state
legislature has authority to meddle with such prerogatives of
the citizen under the guise or masquerade of the police power.
By way of summary, it seems that any attempt to pump
vitality into the code concept is bound to fail, because that
concept is impossible of existence under a constitutional system of the division of powers. The code concept was an
exotic, an imported article. It might do in a "corporative
state" like the present-day Italy, or in any other despotism,
where one person or group absorbs all executive and legislative power, with the judiciary existing only to relieve the
dictator of the troublesome details of administering justice. It
can never do in a country like ours, where we understand
something of how to insure a reasonable freedom of action,
and where we still have a constitution, with plenty of vitality,
as shown by the unanimous decision of yesterday.

NEW BOOKS
Mr. F. D. Stackhouse asks that our readers be advised
that the Law Library of the District Court has just received
Revised Edition, in two (2) Volumes, by Charles Warren,
"The Supreme Court in United States History."

THE UTILITY MELTING POT
By OMAR E. GARWOOD, of the Denver Bar
HILE we are casting into the crucible of "public use"
an ever-increasing amount of private American business, with a confusing mixture of approval and disapproval by the judicial branches of our national and state
governments, an interesting evolution is taking place which
potentially may alter the structure of our American system of
government and change the axiomatic alignment of powers to
such extent that we may be compelled to recognize a fourth
department, under the designation of administrative power.
MILK AS A UTILITY
The Court of Appeals of New York, recognized as one
of the ablest tribunals in America, has held that the sale of
milk is a paramount industry and is clothed with a public
interest and the state, through an administrative agency, may
fix the price and deny the citizen a license to engage in the
business:
For eighteen cents a Rochester grocer sold two
bottles of milk and a loaf of bread, and thereby committed
a crime. Thus milk has been made a public utility and the
lawful minimum price in New York is nine cents per quart.
ICE IS NOT A UTILITY

But the manufacture and sale of ice will not mix in the
utility melting pot; the Supreme Court of the United States
says that it is a private business and is not subject to such
regulation by the legislative branch of the government.
Affectation with a public interest, the equivalent of a
certificate of public convenience, the police power, the exigencies of relief in a nation-wide depression, unemployment,
over-production and economic necessity of price control are
considerations that enter into the problem of what may and
what may not be classified as a utility. The legislature cannot by mere legislative fiat convert a business into a public
utility; the concept of a public utility is not static.
PRICE -FIXING
Price-fixing in economic emergencies is not new. Parliament has fixed the price of commodities and services many
174
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times, and our own colonies, during the Revolution, fixed the
price of almost every marketable commodity.
Emergency measures to control rentals on real estate, fire
insurance rates, prices of bread, the services of chimney
sweepers, the operation of cotton gins and flour mills have
been upheld as within the regulatory powers of the legislature, but the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that production and sale of food and clothing cannot be subjected to price regulation on the basis of public use; nor can
the business of renting houses and apartments, except as
temporary measures to tide over grave emergencies. An arbitration board may not fix wages, the state may not fix the
price of gasoline, or the price of theatre tickets by speculators,
or the fees of employment agents.
If cotton ginning and flour milling are paramount industries in some states and are clothed with public use sufficient
to place them in the utility classification, it would seem that
in Colorado the beet sugar industry, coal mining, metal mining, dairying, poultry and eggs, the peach and cantaloupe
industries, all of which are of dominant importance in their
communities, may likewise be held to be so charged with
public interest as to empower the legislature to regulate prices,
control supply, grant and withhold licenses, and even create
monopoly without transcending its police power or violating
the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
THE MARCH OF BUREAUCRACY

Each conversion of private business to a public use
classification means the creation of another statutory administrative agency-a new bureau, commission or board of control. Thus the march of bureaucracy goes forward with increasing power until American business finds itself enmeshed
in a tangle of administrative regulations depriving it of its
right to determine the prices of commodities, the levels of
wages, hours of employment, rates of service, the number of
acres of wheat, cotton or corn it may plant, or the number of
hogs it may raise. The outstanding political and legal development of the 20th century is this harvest of administrative tribunals. Lincoln's government "of the people, by the
people and for the people," is being transformed, it is sug-
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gested, into a government of bureaucracy, by bureaucracy and
for bureaucracy. A Lord Chief Justice of England has named
it "The New Despotism" and has published a book on the
subject. The American Bar Committee on Citizenship has
pronounced it a menace to the safety of American institutions.
In 1926 President Coolidge said:
"Of all forms of government, those administered by bureaus are
about the least satisfactory to an enlightened and progressive people.
Being irresponsible, they become autocratic, and being autocratic they
resist all development. Unless bureaucracy is constantly resisted it breaks
down representative government and overwhelms democracy. It is the
one element in our institutions that sets up the pretense of having authority over everybody and being responsible to nobody."
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

Though foreign to our scheme of government, and
unrecognized and unclassified as yet in our system of jurisprudence, administrative bureaus already constitute the largest part of our governmental machinery. Yet the Supreme
Court of Ohio has said "there is no such power as administrative power. All powers of government are vested in three
departments, legislative, executive and judicial." These
bureaus, frequently referred to as tribunals, make their own
rules of procedure, formulate their own practices and methods
of investigation, conduct hearings under their own rules of
evidence, and arrive at and enforce their quasi-judgments
without the impediments of code, common law or statutory
control, and the citizen whose personal or property rights
are affected has very limited opportunity of judicial review,
because these tribunals exercise discretionary power. Constitutional limitations have had slight restrictive effect on the
growth of bureaucracy though the final word has not yet
been spoken by the judiciary.
The tendency to fasten the attribute of a public interest,
and the equivalent of a certificate of convenience and necessity,
upon such a multitude of private businesses and industries is
stretching the police and general welfare powers of government to the point of danger, unless, forsooth, we have arrived at the place where we are ready to alter our form of
government. How deeply we shall submerge American business and industry in the utility melting pot is a political and

DICTA

177

constitutional question fraught with unusual interest to
lawyers, judges, statesmen and the public at large. The legislative trend is undoubtedly toward price-fixing, expansion of
public control of business and continual increase of administrative boards, bureaus and commissions.
References: Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155, 41 S. Ct. 458, 459; Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77; 39 Yale Law Journal, 1089, 1094; New State
Ice Co. v. Liebman, 52 S. Ct. 371, 285 U. S. 262; People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259:
Frost v. Corp. Commission, 278 U. S. 515; German American Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S.
389, 34 S. Ct. 612.

OUR JUSTICE COURTS
The following is taken from the Ohio Bar Association
report of April 1, 1935:
"An opportunity to end the crying evil of the justice of the peace
courts in Ohio is offered to the legislature in the pending Wilkins bill,
which has been recommended for passage by the Judiciary Committee of
the Ohio House of Representatives.
"The brand of 'justice' dispensed by many of these courts, especially
in the vicinity of large cities, is indefensible. The only requirement for a
justice of the peace is that he be a voter of the district in which he functions. He may be corrupt; he may be ignorant-but if elected he is the
man to whom a large part of the population must look for justice in
minor civil and criminal cases. * * *
"This bill is the product of thorough study by an Ohio State Bar
Association committee, headed by Henry G. Binns, Columbus attorney.
It has the approval also of the Judicial Council of Ohio, composed of the
chief justice of the Supreme Court and representatives of the other judicial
benches in the state.
"It promises even-handed justice for the small litigant and the
minor offender, now at the mercy of incompetent, sometimes venal,
squires. The legislature should pass the bill without hesitation and open
the way for a long needed reform."---Columbus Citizen.

Denver is fortunate in having as the justices in our two
Justices of the Peace Courts, Mr. Henry S. Lindsley and Mr.
James N. Sabin, two young lawyers who have devoted a
great deal of time and effort toward improvement of Justice
Court practice and who have been patient and courteous at
all times and have given universal satisfaction in their administrations.
The crying evil connected with our Justice of the Peace
Courts is that unauthorized practice continues in full and
uninterrupted sway.

LAW LIBRARIANS CONVENTION
By FRED Y. HOLLAND

T

HE American Association of Law Libraries will hold

its annual convention in Denver the last week of this
month, June 24-29, 1935. This convention will bring
to Denver the law librarians of practically all the large institutional and State Law Libraries of the Country. Most of
these are members of the Bar, and many are also professors
of law of various law schools.
Professor Eldon R. James, Librarian and Law Professor of Harvard Law School, is the President of the Association,
and under his personal supervision an excellent program on
subjects of interest to the legal profession and law librarians
has been arranged. Members of the Bench and Bar of Colorado, and the faculties and students of the law schools are
cordially invited to attend the conferences. I would direct
your special attention to the papers to be read by Dean James
Grafton Rogers and Dean Robert L. Stearns, and the programs of the Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning
sessions. Also the joint banquet at which Judge B. C. Hilliard
of the Supreme Court and President Thurston Davies of
Colorado College will be the principal speakers. A limited
number of reservations will be available for lawyers and law
students desiring to attend.
Through the kindness of the officers of the Denver Bar
Association, the regular monthly luncheon meeting will be
held on Thursday, June 27th, 12:15 P. M. in the Ballroom
at the Brown Palace Hotel. Visiting librarians have been
invited to attend this meeting. Professor James will be the
principal speaker, and it is hoped that there will be large attendance of members of the Denver Bar to hear this distinguished visitor.
The Convention program follows:
178
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"THIRTIETH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES
June 24-29, 1935.
MONDAY, JUNE 24TH, 10:00 A. M., at Supreme Courtroom: Addresses of Welcome
by Hon. Charles C. Butler, Chief Justice, and George Dexter Blount, President
of the Denver Bar Association
Response: William R. Roalfe, Law Librarian, Duke University.
2:30 P. M. Business meeting.
TUESDAY, JUNE 25TH: Outing at Estes Park.
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26TH, 2:30 P. M., Drawingroom, Brown Palace Hotel. Joint
meeting with the National Association of State Libraries.
Addresses:
"Opportunities for Regional Law Library Service," Arthur S. Beardsley, Law
Librarian, University of Washington.
"The Law Library of Congress," John T. Vance, Law Librarian of Congress.
"Colorado-A Study in Frontier Sovereignty," Robert L. Stearns, Member of
the Denver Bar, Advisor, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, American Bar Association,
8:30 P. M. Room 828, Brown Palace Hotel. Round Table on Duplication of
Law Books. Fred Y. Holland, Second Vice-President, presiding.
"Auditing the Lawbooks; the Way to Relief from the Lawbook Burden," by
Philip N. Johnston of the Nebraska Bar.
Members of Panel: Mr. Baxter, Mr. Beardsley, and Miss Parma.
THURSDAY, JUNE 27TH, 10:00 A. M., Room 214, Brown Palace Hotel, William
R. Roalfe, First Vice-President, presiding.
Addresses:
"The Law Library of 1985," Olive C. Lathrop, Librarian, Detroit Bar Association Library.
"The Law Library of the University of Minnesota," Arthur C. Pulling, Law
Librarian.
"Foreign Law Books in American Law Libraries," Samuel E. Thorne, Law
Librarian, Northwestern University.
"Reference Work in a Law Library of Under 50,000 Volumes," Dr. G. E.
Wire, Worcester, Massachusetts.
12:15 P. M.
Luncheon, Denver Bar Association, in the Ballroom of Brown Palace Hotel.
2:30 P. M. Room 828, Brown Palace Hotel. Business meeting.
FRIDAY, JUNE 28TH, 2:30 P. M.
Joint meeting with the National Association of State Libraries. Eldon R. James,
President, American Association of Law Libraries, presiding.
Addresses:
"The Literature of Early Law Making in the Mountain States," James Grafton
Rogers, Dean of the Law School, University of Colorado.
"Plans for the Development of the National Archives," Dr. Robert D. W.
Connor, United States Archivist.
7:00 P. M., Brown Palace Hotel.
Joint Banquet with the National Association of State Libraries. George Seymour
Godard, Librarian, Connecticut State Library, toastmaster.

Addresses:
Justice Benjamin C. Hilliard, Supreme Court of Colorado.
President Thurston Davies, Colorado College.

Pictaphun
TRIAL JUDGES, CALIFORNIA STYLE
A long time ago Isaac Melman, Esq., of this here bar, called our
atteantion to People v. Reese, 29 P. (2d) 450. This appears to be
the setting or dramatis personae or both:
Place: Los Angeles (pronounced Loze Ahnglaze) court house.
Characters: Supreior Judge* Charles S. Burnell, presiding; Tracy
Chatfield Becker, Deputy District Attorney, for the People; Kirtland
I. Perky, Esq., et al., for the defendants.
We quote, freely, from the report of the case as follows:
. . in giving the required statu"On the first day of the trial
tory admonition to the jury . . . cautioning them to have nothing
the judge made the following reto do with the attorneys . .
marks: 'So just be a little bit careful, please. I don't want you to
think that these gentlemen all have leprosy, or smallpox, that you have
to get from them, but just kindly figure they have all got the- measles,
or something you don't want to be exposed to. It is just a little tip,
ladies and gentlemen, because I don't want anything talked around
such as I have indicated . .
to the reading of
"Referring to objections of counsel .
. and to the fact
testimony given . . . on a former trial .
the witness might return . . . the trial judge said: 'If he is (has
returned to the State), anyone that wishes can put him on the stand,
but the idea is to get the facts before the jury, and not to play a game to
see how many points either side can win.' "
". . . Following a recess . . . the judge remarked: 'All
right, proceed. Both sides of the show are here. We might just as
well go ahead.' "
"It appears that one of the attorneys .
. was looking in a
'bag' which was the property of one of the other attorneys in the
case, and the judge said: 'Judge Perky's bag; we want to make sure
which judge you are talking about. I only hope it doesn't leak on you,
Mr. Lawson.'"
"When a complaining witness had testified that he had paid .
$20,000 to one of the defendants in connection with the sale of shares
of stock, the attorney for the people asked him: 'Q. Did you get
anything for that $20,000? A. Not a thing.' The judge then interposed the following question: 'You got experience, didn't you?' A.
'Plenty of that.' "
"On another occasion, the court made the following remarks to a
witness on the stand: 'Mr. Robinson, you are just a little too eager
to answer questions without giving either side a chance to object. If
*Ours are District Judges.
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you see either of these gentlemen going through gesticulations or motions
that indicate that they are about to give birth to an objection, just stop
a moment.'"
"During the reading of certain testimony, Mr. Perky and Mr.
Kelby took turns in reading from the transcript, and on one occasion,
as Mr. Kelby was about to take up the reading, the judge made the
following comment: 'All right; we will listen to the reading of the
Word from the Reverend Kelby now.' "
"With reference to the proposed reading
checks which had been introduced as exhibits .

.
.

.
.

. of several
the judge made

this remark: 'There is no heart or sex appeal in reading checks.' "
"It appears that counsel for the people had a book which belonged
to Judge Perky . . . and that Judge Perky had made an inquiry
for it; whereupon the judge remarked: 'Well, I don't think anyone
would want to take a date book away from you, Judge Perky, particularly if it contained any live telephone numbers.' "
"In cross-examination of a witness . . . one of the attorneys
for the defendants

. .

.

asked a question which had a tendency to

distinguish between two persons who bore the same name. In connection therewith, the judge made the following remark: 'Well, it is
assuming facts not in evidence. In the first place, it is assuming that
she is particular. We don't know whether she is or not . .
"During the examination of a witness, reference was made to the
kind of work which he was doing, and the court said: 'What was he
doing, flagpole sitting?' "
"Referring to another witness, the court said: 'Well, he has
made his explanation of why he made a certain remark, indicating a
tendency, perhaps, to commit the crime of mayhem.' "
"Referring to the fact that one judge may not agree with another
with reference to some question of law, the judge

.

.

.

made the

following disparaging remark: 'He (Judge White) might have made
a different ruling on some question than I might have made. We do
not always agree, and that is why we have Supreme Courts, and rubber
mats on cuspidors
"Commenting upon certain proposed exhibits in the case, the
judge remarked: 'Are you about to introduce the three wise monkeys
as an exhibit here?' Whereupon counsel for the prosecution said:
"'There is only one prosecution counsel.'
"The Court: 'Gentlemen, it is practically twelve o'clock, and
I think that is a happy thought to adjourn with.' "
And so do we. The Appellate Court determined the defendants
were not hurt by the judge's conduct, although it confessed that "In
cases too numerous to properly admit* of citation thereof (we don't
know why it would have been improper), because of judicial misconduct that was insignificant compared to that which so unmistakably
appears in the instant case, the respective judgments were reversed."
*Observe that split infinitive!

INSURANCE -

FIRE -

SOLE OWNERSHIP -

EVIDENCE OF VALUE-

MORTGAGE-Universal Insurance Co. vs. Arrigo-No. 13475Decided April 29, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff below recovered on a fire insurance policy for loss of residence and household goods occasioned by fire.
1. Where it appears that at the time policy was issued that the
agents of insurance company knew that plaintiff was not the sole owner
of the house but that her husband was purchasing same on time and had
agreed to deed the property to her as soon as he acquired the full title and
all this was carried out before the fire occurred, the provision in the policy
rendering the policy void if the interest of the assured be other than unconditional and sole ownership, did not void the policy.
2. Conversations between the plaintiff and her husband and the
insurance agents who solicited and procured the insurance were admissible
without preliminary proof of their agency, in view of our statute providing that any person who solicits and procures an application for insurance shall be deemed to be the company's agent in any controversy between the parties.
3. Where a person bought a property, lived in it for several years
and improved it, he was competent to testify as to value.
4. Where insured placed a deed of trust against the property nearly
three years after the policy was issued, such encumbrance did not void the
policy nor come within the prohibition of a clause which made the policy
void if the insured concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concerning the insurance.-Judgment affirmed.

WILLS-CHARITABLE BEQUESTS-CONSTRUCTION-LACK OF TRUS-

tee--Jeffreys et al. vs. Internatibnal Trust Co.-No. 13336Decided April 29, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
The International Trust Company, as executor, presented a will for
probate to which a caveat was filed. Will sustained by both County and
District Courts.
1. Where will is attacked for lack of testamentary capacity and
juries in two courts found that testatrix had such capacity and the evidence is conflicting and the findings are amply supported by the evidence,
such findings will not be disturbed.
2. The court, in proceedings to probate a will in this state, has
power to pass upon all objections made in the caveat to the legality of the
contents of the will and is required to do so.
3. If a portion of the will is void and the rest valid and binding,
the will must be admitted to probate only as to the part that is valid and
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binding and it is only where the entire contents of a will are void, that it
must be declared not subject to probate.
4. Where a will, omitting its formal parts, states: "I make the
International Trust Company of Denver my executor. I leave my entire estate after payment of my just debts to the Denver Foundation for
the benefit of needy Denver people," such will is not invalid because it
fails to name a trustee to carry out the purpose of the bequest, where it
appears that there is an organization, unincorporated, known as the Denver Foundation to accept as trustees charitable and benevolent bequests
and devises.
5. It is sufficient if the testatrix has provided or indicated some
method or means of selecting from the class or group the particular individuals to receive the benefit of the charitable bequest or devise.
6. The testatrix sufficiently indicated a desire that the trust should
be administered in accordance with the Denver Foundation plan and under that plan the distribution committee has authority to select the particular individuals to receive the benefit of the bequest.-Judgment
affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION -

ORDER FORBIDDING LOCKOUT -

TEMPT-JURISDICTION-BUSINESS

CON-

AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC

INTEREST-The People et al. us. Aladdin Theatre CorporationNos. 13367-13368-Decided April 29, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
Defendant below is charged in contempt with the violation of a
mandatory injuction forbidding the continuance of a lockout and directing the reinstatement of employees. To review a judgment discharging
defendant, the Commission prosecutes this writ.
1. One operating a theatre is not operating a business affected with
a public interest and, therefore, is not subject to the provisions of the
Industrial Commission Act of the State of Colorado declaring strikes and
lockouts unlawful, prior to or during a hearing on disputes between employees and employers over wages, hours or conditions of employment.Judgment affirmed.
WATERS-PRIORITIES-CAPTURED

WATER-Dalpez vs. Nix-No.

13665-DecidedApril 29, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
This action was brought by Nix to secure an adjudication of his
right to the use of waters for irrigation which he claimed were developed
from seepage and springs and except for such developments would not
have reached a natural water course. He had judgment below.
1. One who artificially develops or produces water and adds or
turns the same into a natural stream, which water would not in due
course otherwise have reached the stream, may acquire a right thereto
superior to the adjudicated rights of earlier appropriators of the natural
waters of the stream.
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2. However, it is incumbent on him to establish by clear and satisfactory evidence that the water thus added was produced and contributed
by him and that, if not interfered with, it would not have reached the
stream.
3. Where it appears that the county at its own expense put in a
tile drainage system to prevent flood or bogging of a county road which
developed water for irrigation, but no part of such expense was borne by
plaintiff nor by his efforts, such water so developed does not give plaintiff a superior right to that of other appropriators of the stream, especially
where it appears that such water would have ultimately reached the
stream if not intercepted.--Judgmentreversed with directions.

COUNTIES-PLEADING-PROPER METHOD OF SUING COUNTY-John
Deere Plow Co. vs. The County of Phillips-No. 13400-Decided
May 6, 1935-Opinionby Mr. Justice Hilliard.
An action to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgment of dismissal entered and taxpayer assigns error.
1. The proceedings in the court below were brought against "The
County of Phillips, State of Colorado."
An action so brought is not
maintainable.
2.
In all suits or proceedings by or against a county the name in
which the county shall sue or be sued shall be the Board of County Comm issioners of the county of --------------------------------3.
A suit brought against County of Phillips was improperly
brought. It should have been brought against the Board of County
Commissioners of the County of Phillips, as that is the corporate name
of the county for purposes of suit.---Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.

TAXATION - EXCISE TAXES - CONSTITUTIONALITY-WHEN CANNOT BE QUESTIONED-Wade et at. vs. State of Colorado-No.
13658-DecidedMay 6, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The State of Colorado filed suit below to recover from the defendant and its bondsman for all taxes and penalties due under the Motor
Fuel Act. The State had judgment below.
1. The defendant below and its sureties are not in a position to
attack the constitutionality of the Motor Fuel Act, because they would
receive no benefit, neither would they suffer any injury by or through
a holding as to the validity or invalidity of the Act.
2.
The defendant below sought and obtained a privilege under
the statute as a distributor of motor fuel and in securing the motor fuel
it collected the tax imposed by the Motor Fuel Act from the purchasers,
and no equitable principle permits it to receive the privileges of collecting
a tax and retaining the proceeds, and then attack the constitutionality of
the law under which it collected such tax.
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3.
As to the tax collected by the defendant, the defendant became
the trustee thereof until such taxes were paid to the State Treasurer.
4. This case falls within the rule that this court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of a statute unless necessary for a determination of the case.
5.
The State was entitled to a judgment without a consideration
of the constitutional questions presented.--Judgmentaffirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - LIMITATIONS ON FILING CLAIMEFFECT OF-Evanoff us. Industrial Commission-No. 13706-

Decided May 6, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
A proceeding under the Workmen's Compensatiton Act, December
4, 1929, as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, John Evanoff was instantly killed. No notice of claim of
benefits was filed until October 13, 1934, when notice was filed by the
widow and the claim rejected.
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act requires that a notice
claiming compensation shall be filed within six months after the injury
or within one year after death resulting therefrom or it is barred.
2. The fact that a doctor, under a contract with the employer,
made an examination of the body of the deceased and the insuring company paid the expense of the burial is not sufficient to take the case out of
the Statute of Limitations, for the claimant had filed no claim and no
claim was recognized.
3.
The exception to the Statute of Limitations applies only to a
claimant to whom compensation has been paid.-Judgment affirmed.

TRUST-CONSTRUCTION-MOOT CASE-RIGHT OF ADOPTED CHILD

-Brunton vs. The International Trust Co.-No. 12792--Decided May 6, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This is a suit concerning what is described as the Brunton Trust.
Suit was brought below to procure decree interpreting and construing the
language of the trust, particularly with reference to the rights of an
adopted child of a beneficiary of the trust, and whether such adopted
child would be considered lawful issue of the beneficiary. John D. Brunton, father of the adopted child, was one of the beneficiaries.
1. Where a trust provides for income to be paid to certain beneficiaries and to the line of each beneficiary which shall consist of the beneficiary and his lawful issue of any degree, and the trust is to continue during the natural lives of the founders and the natural lives of the immediate
beneficiaries, and during the further period of the life of the children of
the beneficiaries and for 2 1 years thereafter, and the lawful issue of each
degree of such line, shall take per sterpes and not per capita, children on
leaving children, under the trust are not entitled to share in the trust concurrently with their respective progenitors.
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2. Hence, the question of whether or not an adopted child of a
living beneficiary should be considered as lawful issue under the terms of
the trust presents a moot question, as such adopted child has no immediate
interest in the trust and any decision rendered would be upon a hypothesis
which may never arise.
3. The lower court should have sustained the defendant's demurrer upon the grounds that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to
afford any relief to the adopted child at this time.
4. Courts are not constituted to render advisory opinions to private litigants and will not adjudicate issues framed upon facts which may
never occur.--Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Holland and Mr. Justice Young not participating.
APPEAL IN ERROR-MOTION TO DISMISS-FILING MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL AFTER JUDGMENT-Neighbors of Woodcraft vs. Charles
W. Hildebrandt-No. 13713-Decided May 6, 1935-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Defendant in error, plaintiff at trial, moves to dismiss the writ of
error on the ground that judgment was entered before leave was sought
for filing a motion for a new trial.
1. Section 238, Code 1921, does not require motion for new trial
to be filed before judgment is entered.
2. Where motion for a new trial is filed after judgment is entered
but otherwise within the required time the judgment is suspended so that
it becomes final only when the motion is overruled.
3. The time of adverse ruling on the losing party's motion for
new trial marks the date when the judgment becomes final fo rthe purpose
of the prosecution of a writ of error.
Motion to dismiss the writ of error denied and supersedeas granted.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITYMANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE-London Guaranteeand Accident Co. vs. Coffeen-No. 13649-Decided March 18, 1935Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
1. Section 4452 Compiled Laws of 1921 as amended by Section
11, Chapter 186, Session Laws of 1929, among other things provides,
"In determining permanent partial disability the Commission shall
ascertain in terms of percentage the extent of general permanent disability which the accident has caused, taking into consideration not only
the manifest weight of evidence, but the general physical condition and
mental training, ability, former employment and education of the injured employee."
2. The use of the words "manifest weight of evidence" does not
impose on the claimant any greater burden of proof than the proof
required where other matters are in issue before the Commission.
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3. This statute means that permanent partial disability shall be
translated into or expressed in terms of general permanent disability and
,the percentage of such general disability fixed.
4. The words "the manifest weight of evidence" are merely one
of the factors to be considered.
5. The actual physical disability or injury that is manifest, apparent, evident to the mind, and clear to the Commission, after the
weighing of the evidence of it, and determining the nature of such
actual disability from the preponderance thereof, is the "manifest weight
of evidence" to which reference is made in the statute.-Judgment
affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACTS-Smalley vs. The Peo-

ple-No. 13502-Decided March 18, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
1. The habitual criminal act found in Chapter 85, Page 309,
Session Laws of 1929, contemplates a single sentence for a second
conviction, not one sentence for the crime charged and another sentence
for being an habitual criminal.
2. This only applies where at the time of filing the information
for second offense, the District Attorney knows of, and therein charges,
the former conviction, or that he learns of it before trial and amends
his information accordingly.-Judgment reversed.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASE-FORFEITURE-Frank

A.

Gustaf-

son, Plaintiff in Error,vs. Frank A. Maxwell, et al., Defendants in
Error-No. 13602-Decided March 4, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired- together to bring about
a forfeiture of his lease. Judgment was for the defendants.
1. The lease contained covenants which warranted forfeiture if
not observed. There is no evidence of a common design among defendants.-Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES-NEGLIGENCE

OF DRIVER-MEDICAL TESTIMONY-

Westfall vs. Kern-No. 13334-Decided March 25, 1935Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
1. Where there is evidence showing that driver of automobile
removed both his hands from the steering wheel while traveling 40.
miles an hour, immediately following an unusual cracking sound and
turned his head to the rear and the car then ran off the road and overturned, injuring plaintiff, a guest, such was sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff.
2. Where the complaint alleged severe injuries, fracture of pelvic
bone, bladder ruptured, vertebrae dislocated and that by reason of such
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injuries that her health was impaired and her vigor and opportunity
for usefulness and happiness was impaired, such allegations were sufficient to admit medical evidence that in the future, in case of marriage
and pregnancy that she would not be able to give birth to a child by
any process of normal delivery.--Judgment affirmed.
CONTRACTS--CONSTRUCTION BY PARTIES--Johnson Oil and Refining
Company, a Corporation,Plaintiff in Error, vs. J. T. Elder, doing
business as Elder's Garage, Defendant in Error-No. 13391Decided March 11, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Suit on account for purchase price of two carloads of gasoline. Defendant counter claimed for overpayment on gasoline previously bought,
and recovered against the plaintiff. The contract price was the general
posted tank wagon price. As a result of a "gas war" defendant contended he should be charged the prevailing tank wagon price. Plaintiff protested, and the defendant thereafter paid the- higher agreed contract price.
1. An action will not lie to recover back money paid voluntarily,
with a full knowledge of the facts and circumstances.--Judgment reversed.
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